Text-Mess: There is no Textual Basis for Application of the Takings Clause to the States by Soifer, Aviam
Text-Mess: There is No Textual Basis for
Application of the Takings Clause
to the States
Aviam Soifer*
There can be no denying that the entire country has witnessed loud,
frequent, and riveting fireworks following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Kelo v. City of New London.' Much of the reaction may have been
orchestrated by well-organized critics of the decision, but the stark and
vehement differences among the Justices surely helped to trigger a striking
reaction full of public outcry, many legislative responses, substantial
commentary, and an unusual number of learned symposia-such as this one.
Despite the sound and fury, however, Kelo actually demonstrates a solid
consensus among the Justices on one basic point: the Takings Clause2 of the
Fifth Amendment long ago was made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 Everyone assumes that this issue is one of the few
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stalwart performance in getting this Symposium launched, presented, and published in such
excellent and timely fashion. All mistakes are my own, of course, but I received invaluable help
as I made them from colleagues Mary Bilder, Al Brophy, David Callies, Maeva Marcus, Carol
Rose, Joseph Sax, and Joseph Singer, and from student assistants Shyla Cockett and Jason
Kaneyuki.
I __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2 As Joseph Sax ably discusses in this Symposium, there are significant implications in
whatever label one chooses as the shorthand for the Fifth Amendment's phrase "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." For this Symposium, I
will defer to the general use of "Takings Clause" by my fellow participants.
3 There was full agreement on this point in Kelo. Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens's first footnote stated simply: "'Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.' U.S. Const., Amdt. 5. That Clause is made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 41 L.
Ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581 (1897)." Kelo, - U.S. at, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 n.1.
Justice O'Connor's dissent made it abundantly clear that she disagreed with the majority
on many points, yet O'Connor was in complete agreement on this one, id. at,-, 125 S. Ct. at
2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Ihe Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable
to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment"), even as she launched into her textual argument
about "the unremarkable presumption that every word in the document has independent
meaning." Id. In his Kelo dissent, Justice Thomas acknowledged that some state constitutions
lacked just compensation clauses at the time of the founding, but claimed that this "bedrock
principle" was adopted by the Framers in the Fifth Amendment, albeit "not incorporated against
the States until much later." Id. at _, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For
textual support for a "bedrock principle" that did not actually apply "until much later," Thomas
cited only Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n. 15 (1992). In that
footnote, Justice Scalia's Lucas opinion relied exclusively on Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
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surrounding the Takings Clause that has been settled. A month before Kelo,
for example, Justice O'Connor used virtually the same language and the same
citation concerning Fifth Amendment/Fourteenth Amendment incorporation
in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. 4 as Stevens used in Kelo.5
But there is a problem with this move. The Court is accurate in saying that
the move has been used for over a century. But its problematic nature is parti-
cularly stark for anyone who purports to be a textualist. Taking constitutional
texts seriously is worth a few moments, even for those of us who do not loudly
proclaim ourselves to be textualists. Unnoticed or entirely forgotten though
the textual problem appears to be,6 a brief consideration of why it arose and
how the Court has filled a particularly stark textual lacuna is illuminating.
I. THE TEXTUAL PROBLEM
The Fifth Amendment ends its list Section 1 of the Fourteenth
of important personal guarantees Amendment, concludes in this way:
as follows: "Nor be deprived of "Nor shall any State deprive any
life, liberty, or property, without person of life, liberty, or property,
due process of law; nor shall without due process of law; nor
private property be taken for deny to any person within its
public use, without just jurisdiction the equal protection of
compensation."7  the laws."8
Railroad Co. for the "incorporation of the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses." Id. Justice
Kennedy's decisive concurring opinion in Kelo did not address the incorporation issue. But
elsewhere Kennedy often has joined opinions that reflect the longstanding consensus about
incorporation of the Takings Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment, indicated simply by
citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co.
4 __ U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2005). Here the Court was unanimous, though
Justice Kennedy wrote a one-paragraph concurring opinion discussing other issues.
5 O'Connor relied exclusively on Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. for her
point that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was "made applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth." Id. The Lingle Court emphatically rejected "a freestanding takings
test" and "an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test." Id. at -, 125 S. Ct.
at 2083. Indeed, the Court roundly condemned the "substantially advances" formula it had
earlier embraced because such a test is "tethered neither to the text of the Takings Clause nor
to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be challenged under the Clause." Id.
at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2084. As we will see, however, any possible tether to the text of the
Takings Clause that might be invoked to govern takings by state and local governments is,
ironically, invisible.
6 Joe Singer makes the point that our tendency in legal education starkly to separate
courses and to stress coverage may help to explain why this problem slides by. E-mail from Joe
Singer, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School to author (Apr. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
Property teachers tend to miss its constitutional law context, and constitutional law teachers tend
to omit Takings Clause cases entirely. Id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
8 Id. amend. XIV, 1.
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This poses an irrefutable logical problem:
1. The Framers of the Bill of Rights, i.e., James Madison and whoever
else we might wish to identify as within this exalted cohort, obviously thought
it important to add the Takings Clause to the "life, liberty, or property"
guarantees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Core rights of "life, liberty, or property" needed to be supplemented if the
constitutional text were to provide a guarantee of just compensation for the
taking of private property. Thus the Fifth Amendment contains an added
Takings clause, though early state constitutions did not have such a clause.
The new Takings Clause protected private property rights only against takings
by the federal government.
2. The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment were well-aware of the
specific language of the Fifth Amendment and of Chief Justice John
Marshall's holding in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,' in which a unanimous
Supreme Court emphasized that the Takings Clause did not apply to the
states.' 0
In drafting the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, Congress lifted the Due
Process Clause from the Fifth Amendment and plugged its language haec
verba into the Fourteenth Amendment. But they entirely omitted the Takings
Clause. Nor does the Takings Clause language appear elsewhere in the text
of the Federal Constitution.
.*. The text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply the Takings
Clause to the states.
This omission is glaring. Like the vital clue for Sherlock Holmes when the
dog did not bark in The Adventure of Silver Blaze," this failure to make any
Takings Clause noise ought to command our attention. Any genuine textualist
has to be deeply troubled by a great paradox. How can an omitted text possib-
ly be said to be included in the very text from which it was so clearly omitted?
As we will see, it took just such an exquisite somersault for the
incorporation of the Takings Clause to be accomplished in the 1890s. A
Supreme Court uninhibited by textual constraints performed the trick. Natural
rights rhetoric and great and explicit enthusiasm for substantive due process
provided the trampoline in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicago2 and similar cases.
' 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
'0 Id. at 250-51.
" ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES (Berkely Books 1963) (1892). Sherlock Holmes understood that the dog would have
been quiet only for the owner, and thereby cracked the case.
12 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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A. Inadvertent Omission?
As a preliminary matter, however, we should note that there is no way for
a textualist to argue that the omission of the Takings Clause from the
Fourteenth Amendment was somehow an oversight-a kind of mid-nineteenth
century equivalent of the contemporary computer glitch. This claim cannot
pass the straight-face test for several reasons:
First, it would need to ignore the clarity and great weight of Barron v.
Mayor of Baltimore.13 This famous decision was acknowledged as the leading
precedent on the subject, well known to any and all competent lawyers at the
time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1833, the great Chief
Justice John Marshall could hardly have been more explicit. In Barron,
Marshall emphatically did not follow his usual nationalist instincts. Instead,
he rejected a claim by property holder Barron that Baltimore's failure to
dredge the sludge engulfing Barron's wharf amounted to a taking of his
property withoutjust compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. 14
The unanimous Court was blunt:
We are of the opinion that the provision in the Fifth Amendment to the
constitution, declaring that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation, is intended solely as a limitation on the exercise of
power by the government of the United States, and is not applicable to the
legislation of the states."5
Marshall described the question about application of the Takings Clause to
the states to be "of great importance, but not of much difficulty."' 6 Marshall's
contemporaries and those who followed virtually all agreed. For decades,
Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore remained the standard citation for the core
concept that the Federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states.
" 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243.
'4 Id.
15 Id. at 250-51.
6 Id. at 247. There is much fine historical work that supports Marshall's point from various
perspectives. Excellent work by legal historians such as William Treanor, Morton Horwitz, and
Matt Harrington, for example, underscores the point that the very idea of the Takings Clause
was a relatively late concept, not requested as a constitutional amendment by any state. It was
inserted in the Fifth Amendment through James Madison largely for hortatory purposes, because
people in the new Republic had little fear of the federal government taking property. See, e.g.,
William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694 (1985); Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution
in Perspective: Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57 (1987); Matthew P. Harrington, Public Use and the Original Understanding
of the So-Called "Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (2002).
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Indeed this point was so firmly established that in 1872 Justice Miller's
unanimous opinion in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 7 had to construe the
Wisconsin Constitution because, as Miller emphatically explained, the new
Fourteenth Amendment did not change long-settled federal constitutional
doctrine: "[T]hough the Constitution of the United States provides that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation,
it is well settled that this is a limitation on the power of the Federal
government, and not on the States."'18 This was four years after Secretary of
State William P. Seward declared the Fourteenth Amendment officially
ratified.
From the era of the framing of the Constitution and the Bill or Rights
through Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore and well beyond, it thus was clear that
a property owner could not expect to make out a federal case with any claim
that a state or local government had deprived him of his property without just
compensation. If one did have a colorable federal constitutional claim against
a state involving property, it had to be clothed not in Fifth Amendment
language, but rather in the changeable context of the Contracts Clause and/or
linked to unwritten natural rights doctrine.19 In work that analyzes nineteenth
century property rights claims in detail, moreover, leading legal historians
such as Morton Horwitz, Stanley Kutler, Leonard Levy, William Novak,
Harry Scheiber, and Gordon Wood all have emphasized the very narrow
protection afforded individual property claims and the surprisingly broad
deference generally given to public welfare claims.2 °
17 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). Obviously the Court's jurisdictional rules surrounding
writs of error were quite different from the current jurisdictional rules, and the Court was not
similarly concerned with the niceties of "independent" and "adequate state grounds," when it
reviewed state court decisions. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
I8 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 176-77.
'9 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). Chief Justice John Marshall
relied primarily on natural rights/common law principles and his alternative Contracts Clause
claim clearly was a secondary argument. Further, Justice William Johnson's dissent relied
exclusively on natural rights, anchored in "the reason and nature of things: a principle which
will impose laws even on the deity." Id. at 143 (Johnson, J., dissenting). See also Proprietors
of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); C.
PETER MCGRATH, YAzOO: LAW AND PoLmIcs IN THE NEW REPuBIic: THE CASE OF FLETCHER
v. PECK (1966). The antebellum Contracts Clause story is well told in STANLEY I. KUTLER,
PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971). See
generally Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Modem State, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 126-28 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998); Mark A. Graber, Naked Land
Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND L. REV. 73 (2000).
20 See Horwitz, supra note 16; KUTLER, supra note 19; LEONARD W. LEVY, LAW OF THE
COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JusTICE SHAW (1957); WILIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Harry N.
Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 71 CAL. L. REV. 217
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Further evidence of the absence of textual support for Federal Takings
Clause claims also turns up, ironically, if one actually reads the original
source for the much-favored citation to Justice Samuel Chase's argument in
Calder v. Bull.21 People still love to quote Chase's famous condemnation of
"a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B" as something "against all
reason and justice. 22 Purported textualists fail to notice, however, what
sources Chase invoked for this argument. Chase relied not on any text, but on
"the greatfirst principles of the social compact" and on "general principles
of law and reason. 23 In fact, Justice James Iredell directly attacked Chase
precisely on the grounds that Chase entirely lacked textual support for his
claims. Iredell insisted on the need to limitjudicial review through textualism
because:
The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and
purest men have differed upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly
say, in such an event, would be, that the legislature (possessed of an equal right
of opinion) has passed an act which, in the opinion of the judges, was incon-
sistent with the abstract principles of natural justice.24
If it is a clear and basic violation of natural justice to take property from A
to give it to B, and if federal courts must afford remedies for such injustices,
there ought to be long lines of claimants, perhaps led by Native Americans
and Native Hawaiians but also joined by many others. Strikingly, however,
doctrines that are not anchored in text have been used repeatedly to defeat
(1984); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OFTHE AMERIcAN REPuBuc: 1776-1787 (1969).
2' 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (holding that Ex Post Facto Clause was limited to
criminal legislation and thus did not bar a Connecticut legislative act setting aside a probate
court decree). Justice O'Connor began her vigorous dissent in Kelo, for example, with this
citation to Justice Chase's natural rights analysis, - U.S. - . 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2671
(2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), and Justice Thomas's dissent also relied upon it to claim that
the Public Use Clause-yet another label for the Takings Clause-"embodied the Framers'
understanding that property is a natural, fundamental right, prohibiting the government from
'taking property from A. and giving it to B.'" Id. at -, 125 S. Ct. at 2680 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Unfortunately for genuine textualists, this embodiment also has
no anchor in the constitutional text. See supra note 3. Indeed, in 1991 several leading legal
historians described the Calder opinion as "the clearest and most definitive expression of
higher-law doctrine to emanate from the United States Supreme Court." KERMIT T. HALL,
WILLIAM M. WIECEK & PAUL FINKELMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 107 (1991).
22 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., dissenting). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975) (examining the natural rights
background and "pure interpretive model" of constitutional inquiry); Edwin Corwin, The
"Higher Law "Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149,365 (1928)
(providing historical background and philosophical underpinnings of "natural law" theory of
constitutional authority).
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such basic justice claims concerning land grabs when raised by indigenous
peoples. A version of sovereign immunity described by Justice Scalia in
remarkably open-ended, nontextual fashion as "the presupposition of our
constitutional structure,"2 for example, defeated a claim by Native Alaskans
for compensation. Other doctrines frequently excuse unjust laws that strongly
suggest actions that are "taking from A. to give to B."26 Within the familiar
tension between natural justice and the technicalities of lawyers' law, it is
easy to discern a pattern that has not favored people who held property
initially, had it taken away in a variety of ways over time (often with the help
of lawyers), and recently have sought legal redress.
B. Possible Explanations for the Omission from the
Fourteenth Amendment
Why was the Takings Clause omitted from the Fourteenth Amendment?
One possibility is that Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore was so well entrenched
that it might seem a radical departure to try to change its approach to property
rights on the local level. Another reason is probably even more salient: by the
time of the Civil War and the Reconstruction-era constitutional amendments,
the issue of slavery had raised the stakes about both property rights and
natural rights in complex ways. At the time the 39th Congress began drafting
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, the leading members of Congress and
25 Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (Native Alaskan
Village akin to foreign sovereign and thus barred from suing state), discussed in AVLAM SOIFER,
LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 85-88 (1995); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54-73 (1996) (Congress lacks Commerce Clause power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity).
26 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388. Judges often use a variety of nontextual constructs to bar
compensation claims made by historically subordinated groups. See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY,
RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921: RACE, REPARATIONS, AND
RECONCILIATION 52-53 (2002) (compensation claims by victims of the Tulsa race riots barred
by the statute of limitations); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance:
Native Hawaiians' Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REv. 1
(1994). In Hall v. United States, 92 U.S. 27 (1875), when the Court analyzed the claim of a
former slave to a share of cotton that he toiled to produce, the Justices unanimously described
the Court's task to be to "roll back the tide of time, and to imagine ourselves in the presence of
the circumstances by which the parties were surrounded when and where the contract is said to
have been made." Id. at 30. The Court then found it unproblematic to bar plaintiff's claim
because, as a slave, he could not legally contract.
There has been a good deal of important recent work dealing with reparations issues in
the United States. See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW
AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a
Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 191 (2003); William Bradford, "With a Very
Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for
Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (2002).
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their allies very recently had "taken" huge amounts of "property" from
southern slaveholders worth many millions of dollars. Just compensation, to
put it mildly, was not a high priority in the context of the Thirteenth
Amendment, nor can it be said to have had much to do with the new inclusion
of "privileges or immunities" or "equal protection" in the Federal Constitution
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
That Congress was sensitive about the takings issue is underscored by its
enactment, during the Civil War, of the District of Columbia Emancipation
Act.27 In addition, at the very time that Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 over President Andrew Johnson's veto and promulgated the text that
became the Fourteenth Amendment, the shape of Reconstruction was still
open and hotly contested. As Republicans sought to establish an effective Re-
construction policy, some of their leaders favored the redistribution of south-
ern land so that even "40 acres and a mule" still seemed a real possibility.28
II. NATURAL RIGHTS, EQUITY, AND THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY
The decisions that began to apply the Just Compensation Clause to the
states in the 1890s merit close scrutiny. As we have seen, for instance, the
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. 29 decision is the basic source for
Justices on all sides in Kelo to apply Takings Clause protections against
actions by the states. But even this key decision generally receives only
passing, formulaic attention.
If we read the whole Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. decision,
however, several important ironies emerge. First, it is absolutely clear that
Justice Harlan's majority opinion was insistently nontextualist. In
characteristic fashion, Harlan did not even try to anchor his analysis within the
text of the Constitution.3" Nor did he attempt to distinguish key precedents
such as Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore and Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.
27 The District of Columbia Emancipation Act, ch. 54, § 1, 12 Stat. 376 (1862) (provided
compensation plan for slaves taken from slaveholders loyal to the Union). For a good
discussion of related issues on the Confederate side, see A] Brophy, "Necessity Knows No
Law": Vested Rights and the Styles of Reasoning in the Confederate Conscription Cases, 69
MIss. L.J. 1123 (2000).
2 See generally Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE L.J. 1916
(1987); Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique ofRaoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 651 (1979).
29 166 U.S. 226 (1897). Chief Justice Melville Fuller did not take part, and Justice David
Brewer dissented because he believed the majority did not go far enough in protecting the rights
of the property holder.
30 For a good description of Harlan's abiding enthusiasm for judicial intervention through
substantive due process, see LINDA PRZYBYSZEWsKi, THE REPUBLIC ACCORDING TO JOHN
MARSHALL HARLAN 158-67 (1999).
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Instead, Harlan' s opinion asserted that "natural equity"31 compelled the Court
to stretch Due Process protections beyond procedure to substance. He relied
primarily on a smattering of state court decisions and treatises he favored. At
one point, in fact, Harlan simply asserted: "Due protection of the rights of
property has been regarded as a vital principle of republican institutions."32
Perhaps "due protection" ought to be a constitutional concept. Yet as invoked
here by Justice Harlan, the phrase almost makes ajoke of the claim that judges
ought to be limited by a specific constitutional text.
Further, Harlan was quite explicit that substantive due process was the
doctrine upon which the Court relied. He wrote, for example, that "judicial
authorities may keep within the letter of the statute prescribing forms of
procedure in the courts and give the parties interested the fullest opportunity
to be heard, and yet it might be that [a state's] final action would be
inconsistent"33 with the Fourteenth Amendment.
In retrospect, there is a great deal more that is ironic in this opinion. The
majority insisted that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right applies to state
jury trials.34 In a final irony, the majority upheld-over Justice Brewer's
strenuous dissent-the Illinois jury's decision to award a symbolic one dollar
to the railroad even though the city put a street across its railroad tracks. This,
Harlan wrote, was "a fair and full equivalent for the thing taken" by the
public.35
31 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 238.
32 Id. at 235-36.
33 Id. at 234-35.
' Id. at 242-43. The last clause of the Seventh Amendment, according to the Court,
"applies equally to a case tried before a jury in a state court and brought here by writ of error
from the highest court of the State." Id. Harlan noted that state court jury decisions could be
reviewed "only to inquire whether the trial court prescribed any rule of law for the guidance of
the jury that was in absolute disregard of the company's right to just compensation." Id. at 246.
In contrast to the broad Takings Clause part of Harlan's opinion, these more specific and more
procedural Seventh Amendment aspects have not been followed. See, e.g., Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (no federal right to civil jury trial in state
courts).
35 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 242. Harlan's extensive discussion of
this point emphasized that the railroad "took its charter subject to the power of the State to
provide for the safety of the public" and "laid its tracks subject to the condition necessarily
implied that their use could be so regulated by competent authority as to insure the public
safety." Id. at 252.
Indeed, Harlan announced:
The company must be deemed to have laid its tracks within the corporate limits of the city
subject to the condition-not, it is true, expressed, but necessarily implied-that new
streets of the city might be opened and extended from time to time across its tracks, as the
public convenience required, and under such restrictions as might be prescribed by
statute.
Id. at 250.
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This was hardly a glorious period for the Supreme Court. The Justices who
produced the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. decision had given
the world Plessy v. Ferguson36 less than a year earlier. Also this was basically
the same array of Justices who had handed down an infamous trilogy of
decisions in 1895, including one that Charles Evans Hughes famously cited
as an example of the Court's "self-inflicted wounds."37 This Court's struggles
to invalidate paternalistic government action and class-based legislation
produced inconsistency at best3" and the Justices' frequent wrestling with
substantive due process in the realm of Takings by both federal and state
governments39 offers a cautionary tale.
It is illuminating to consider how sharply the presumptions in the Court's recent
regulatory takings decisions contrast even with those of the Court in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Dolan
v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
36 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
37 CHARLES EvANS HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 50-54 (1928)
(Hughes listed the rehearing, switched vote, and ultimate invalidation of the federal income tax
in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 696 (1895), as one of three examples of the
Supreme Court's self-induced "disesteem." Two other notorious decisions in 1895 were:
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (Congress lacked constitutional authority
to regulate acquisition that gave single corporation control of ninety-eight percent of nation's
sugar refining capacity) and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (federal government had inherent
power to use labor injunction against union leadership to halt national Pullman strike)). See
generally ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1960).
38 See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-
Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897,61 J. OF
AM. HIST. 970 (1975); Richard Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court, 1873-
1903, 29 BUFF. L. REv. 667 (1980); Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249
(1987).
39 United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896) (upholding federal taking
of battlefield as an incident of federal sovereignty); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S.
403 (1896) (preceding Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. in invoking Fourteenth
Amendment due process to uphold railroad's Takings claim, thereby reversing the Nebraska
Supreme Court decision that allowed the State Board of Transportation to order railroad to
permit farmers to build needed grain elevator on railroad right of way). There is, moreover,
deep historic irony in the almost forgotten fact that the Court had earlier considered Bill of
Rights claims against a state as it reviewed the Illinois conviction of August Spies in Spies v.
Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). Spies, an anarchist on the lain after the Haymarket Riot of 1886,
successfully eluded capture until he turned himself in. Apparently his trust in the legal process
was misplaced. Spies was executed after the United States Supreme Court rejected his federal
constitutional claims.
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m. FEDERALISM AND FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION
Justice Holmes may have transformed the law of takings with his balancing
test or spectrum approach in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.' But it took
decades more for federal courts to be drawn back into the maelstrom as they
had been in decisions from the 1890s-World War I era. New-fangled zoning,
upheld by the Court in the late 1920s and practical jurisdictional constraints
on federal courts combined with more permissive notions of the appropriate
role of government to keep lower federal court judges from becoming much
entangled in local property disputes. There were even several property-
specific prudential abstention doctrines such as Burford v. Sun Oil Co.4 and
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux42 that warned federal
courts away from even attractive nuisances.
The Lucas-Nollan-Dolan revolution, however, has forced federal judges
into a briar patch of intricate pleading, delays, duplicated efforts, and
unseemly interventions. The esoteric elements of the decision last Term in
San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco," for example, under-
score how treacherous the terrain has become for any lawyer hoping to get a
ripe and final state court decision regarding just compensation without
waiving possible federal constitutional attacks. Interestingly, for example,
most of the heat in the lower court debate in Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff" concerned whether and what kind of abstention rules ought to
apply.45
40 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41 319 U.S. 315,332 (1943) (invoking "equitable discretion" to give Texas courts the first
opportunity to consider "basic problems of Texas policy" in a dispute over oil well drilling
permits). See also Ala. Public Servs. Comm'n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (stressing
importance of allowing state authorities to handle "an essentially local problem" regarding train
regulations).
42 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (divided court upheld federal district court decision in diversity case
to stay federal case, pending resolution of state proceedings regarding city condemnation
action). Ever since, students in Federal Courts classes have struggled to reconcile the Louisiana
Power & Light Co. decision with County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185
(1959), handed down the same day. In County of Allegheny, when Justices Stewart and
Whittaker switched sides, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court disallowed federal abstention
in a Takings Clause action, terming abstention "an extraordinary and narrow exception to the
duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Id. at 188-89.
41 __ U.S. -, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005). The case involves an intricate minuet of trying
to preserve a federal claim in state court, following federal court abstention, while both making
sure a takings claim is ripe and trying to avoid falling prey to various esoteric rules regarding
federal preclusion.
44 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
41 Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
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Here I should confess that a long time ago I went on record at considerable
length and in overly intricate detail criticizing federal court abstention, at least
of the Younger v. Harris' variety. Yet decades later, it seems clearer to me
that there may be some forms of prudential federal court abstention that are
at least justified and probably to be recommended. It begins to seem that a
major example ought to be within the realm of takings/just compensation
jurisprudence.47
We also ought to be skeptical about the wisdom, and even the constitu-
tionality, of current proposals that Congress reach into the realm of state
property law to "overrule" or limit Kelo by federal fiat. The spending power
might stretch past the breaking point if it were to be used in this context. This
is so for a variety of reasons, not least the problems caused by the use of an
attenuated basis for direct interference by Washington, D.C. with traditional,
integral, and essential state functions within the regulation of property.
IV. BEDROCK PRINCIPLES AND THE SANDS OF TIME
Narrow textualist claims are doomed to failure. Even the staunchest
contemporary self-proclaimed textualists easily can be shown to manipulate
or ignore texts they do not much like.48 There may or may not be what the
separate Kelo dissents each dub as "a bedrock principle"49 in the realm of
4 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Aviam Soifer & H.C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine:
Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1141 (1977). I also helped write the brief for
the winning side in Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982), a decision that
established that there should be no need to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking
federal court jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, currently 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
41 Carol Rose suggests a distinction that might allow abstention in the context of regulatory
takings litigation, but not in eminent domain disputes. E-mail from Carol Rose, Lohse Chair
in Water and Natural Resources, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law to
author (May 02, 2006) (on file with author).
" Indisputably stretching the Eleventh Amendment beyond its language comes to mind
immediately, for example, as does entirely ignoring the words of the Ninth Amendment. It turns
out that self-proclaimed textualists such as Justices Scalia and Thomas are sometimes not bound
by words even when it comes to interpreting statutes or quoting dictionaries. See, e.g.,
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't. of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598,
615 (2001) (Scalia, concurring in a decision that refused to award civil rights attorneys' fees and
used a crabbed interpretation of "prevailing party," insisted on a "term of art" interpretation:
"Words that have acquired a specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded their
legal meaning"); Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 616 (1999) (Thomas, dissenting in
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") case, purporting to rely on a dictionary definition of
"discrimination" that misrepresented and even misquoted dictionary source, discussed in Aviam
Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLAL. REV. 1279,
1296 n.68, 1315-16 (2000)).
49 - U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). O'Connor described "a bedrock principle without
which our public use jurisprudence would collapse" that forbids any "purely private taking"
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property rights and takings. A viable principle might sensibly boil down to
unconstitutional arbitrariness. But we already have constitutional texts and
precedents that invalidate such arbitrariness with much less strain than recent
Takings Clause decisions. This is particularly the case now that the Court has
handed down its anomalous little per curiam opinion in Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech.5°
Yet when we say that we feel bound by the text, we really ought to attend
to the words with some care. The blundering Fifth Amendment-Fourteenth
Amendment pifiata contest around the Takings Clause makes it hard to claim
with a straight face that there is textual or contextual support even to apply
that Clause to the states.
If, instead, we want to add words that were intentionally omitted, we ought
to own up to doing so. That would entail interpreting law in the name of
fundamental values: equity, fairness, and other appealing albeit vague
concepts that otherwise might be dubbed judicial activism, or worse.5 1
Indeed, to slip the anchor of textual constraint as clearly as the Court has
done with the Takings Clause is to sound a lot like someone who believes, for
example, that there may be a privacy right in the Federal Constitution. Or like
a lawyer or ajudge who relies upon unspecified, inherent executive power that
seems to become infinitely distensible, no matter what the constitutional text
and judicial precedents say.
But that is another story.
without a justifying public purpose, even if just compensation is paid. Id. at -_, 125 S. Ct. at
2674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Thomas's bedrock principle is different. He claimed "a
bedrock principle well established by the time of the founding" that provides "that all takings
required the payment of compensation." Id. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 2679 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Shifting bedrock could make one wary about the stability of its foundations.
So 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (allegations of "irrational and wholly arbitrary" conduct by
Village in dealing with property owners deemed "quite apart from the Village's subjective
motivation.., sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional equal protection analysis").
Such an open-ended approach to equal protection analysis-apparently not requiring the usual
prerequisite of discriminatory motive-provoked a concurrence by Justice Breyer in which he
attempted to contain the danger of "transforming run-of-the-mill zoning cases into cases of
constitutional right." Id. at 566 (Breyer, J., concurring).
"' In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., - U.S. , 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005), for example, the
Court paradoxically rejected as "regrettably imprecise" its earlier formula that examined ends
and means and asked whether a regulatory taking "'substantially advances"' legitimate state
interests. Id. at __ 125 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980)). In its place, the Court explicitly substituted an undifferentiated substantive due process
test, to be employed henceforth by judges "addressing substantive due process challenges to
government regulation." Id. at _, 125 S. Ct. at 2085.

